The principle of interperation of legal documents was well understood at the time the Constitution was written and what was written was most certainly written with how the words would be interperated in mind. Blackstone summarizes the concept in use at the time. The words would have been written to survive such and interperatation with their intended meaning.
HOW SHOULD THE CONSTITUTION BE READ AND INTERPRETED?
In the volume _Constitutionalism in Perspective: The United States Constitution in Twentieth Century Politics_, the first three essays attempt in the first section to answer the question I've written above. The method of interpretation I'm putting forth here is the one explained by Christopher Wolfe in "How to Read and Interpret the Constitution." Niether Sanford Levinson ("Can One Account for Tastes in Constitutional Interpretation") nor Gary J. Jacobsohn ("Concluding Essay--Rules Are Not Enough: An Argument for Principled Unpredictability") dispute the accuracy or application of Wolfe's presentation. So, we have here a basis upon which we can look at the Amendment and perhaps make judgements about it.
TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION
"The founders acted on an understanding of interpretation which was dominant during the first, or what I call the traditional, era of U.S. constitutional history, which ran from the founding until the end of the nineteenth century. During this era there was, I think, substantial agreement about the general rules of interpretation, although as students of U.S. history know, there was also substantial disagreement about the particualr interpretations of the Constitution on the basis of these common rules."
". . . Constitutional interpretation was viewed as a special case of legal interpretation, drawing especially on the background of rules for legal interpretation developed in English law. Blackstone, for example, has a section on rules of interpretation at the beginning of his influential *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, published on the eve of the American Revolution. I will use this as an example of what the framers assumed as part of the background for their efforts to establish and implement--which required interpreting--the Constitution."
BLACKSTONE ON INTERPRETATION
"Blackstone says that the best way to interpret the law is to explore the intention of the lawgiver at the time the law was made 'by signs the most natural and probable.' There are five basic signs: 'the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law.'"
1. THE WORDS
"The words are to be understood 'in their most usual and most known signification . . . their general and popular use.' This is especially true for the American Constitution, since the document was written for the people, who are the ultimate authority in that government, and one should assume that a writer using words as they are understood by those with whom he wishes to communicate. . . . The one apparent exception to relying on the normal 'popular' usage of words is that there may be some technical terms such as 'Writ of Habeas Corpus' or 'ex post facto Law.' But then, one might argue that, in a certain sense, the technical definition *is* the 'popular' usage. . . . Of course, there might be more doubt with respect to some other terms, e.g., in how technical a sense should the word 'contract' be taken, in Article one, section ten?"
2. THE CONTEXT
"If the meaning of the words is dubious (e.g. ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate), Blackstone says, then the meaning can be established from the context. Blackstone says, then the meaning can be established from the context. This refers not only to the immediate verbal context, but to the broader senses of context. Two examples he gives are first, the preamble of the law whose meaning is in question, and second, the use of the word or words in similar laws passed by the same legislature and relating to the same subject or point.
3. THE SUBJECT-MATTER
"Words are also to be understood in relation to the subject- matter with which the legislator is dealing. If the word has several legitimate meanings, it may be that one of them is particularly apt when the speaker is dealing with one kind of subject rather than another, and that will help to suggest which meaning the legislator intended."
4. EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES
"The next 'sign' Blackstone mentions must be understood carefully. It is deriving aid from the 'effects and consequences' of different meanings. This does not mean that the legislator is free to reject a meaning if he does not like the consequences, in the sense that he favors a different policy view. The rule is applicable to more extreme cases, namely, 'where the words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood.' The classic example was the law of the city of Bologna which prohibited 'drawing blood,' which was construed not to apply to doctors."
5. THE SPIRIT AND REASON OF THE LAW
"But 'the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of the law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it.' Thus, for example, a law ought not to be extended to cases where the reason for the law is inapplicable if the words do not require it."
Wolfe has a good deal more to say about the traditional method of interpretation before going on to compare and contrast it with more modern fashions. What I've extracted here is enough to give us a sound criteria and a common frame of reference.